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PROTECTING RELIGION
THROUGH STATUTE: THE MIXED
CASE OF THE UNITED STATES
By Jay Wexler

he primary source of protection
public schools from discriminating against
for religion in American law is
religious groups that wish to hold after-school
the First Amendment to the U.S.
meetings on school grounds. Many federal
Constitution, which provides that
laws, including the federal income tax law,
“Congress shall make no law respecting
provide
an religious believers with specific exemp
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
tions from various burdens and obligations.
free exercise thereof.” The so-called “Free
The “Civil Rights Act of 1964” (particularly
Exercise Clause” of the First Amendment pro Title VII of that statute) prevents certain
tects, to some degree, the rights of individuals private employers from discriminating against
to practice their religion without interference,
employees on the basis of their religion. The
while the so-called “Establishment Clause”
“Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
prevents the government from providing too
Persons Act” (RLUIPA) prevents local zoning
much support for religion or overly involv
authorities and prisons from burdening the
ing itself with religious institutions. The
beliefs and practices of religious believers with
chief interpreter of the First Amendment is
out a compelling reason. And the “Religious
the U.S. Supreme Court, which has had a
Freedom Restoration Act” (RFRA) prevents
mixed record in protecting religious free
the federal government from doing the same.
dom, particularly for those whose beliefs
As with the First Amendment, Congress’s
are in the minority. Some of the Court’s
success in protecting religion through stat
decisions—such as its decisions banning
ute has been mixed. Sometimes, as with the
school prayer1—are very sensitive to the
Equal Access Act and arguably RFRA (at
interests of religious minorities, while other
least as it applies to the federal government),
decisions—such as its decision to allow the
Congress has provided religion with a signifi
government to indirectly burden the religious
cant amount of protection. Other attempts,
beliefs and practices of individuals through
Jay Wexler is Associate Professor of Law at the Boston University School
general laws2—are not nearly so sensitive.
of Law. His research and teaching interests include law and religion, admin
Although the First Amendment provides
istrative law, and environmental law. He is currently writing a book about
some protection for religious believers, the U.S.
church-state relations in the U.S. This article was first presented at the
Congress has at times found it necessary to
CFIA co-sponsored conference “Law and Religion in Transitional Societies:
supplement this protection through legislation.
Comparative Approaches to the Rule of Law,” held December 2-3,2006 in
Oslo, Norway. For the full conference proceedings visit www.cfia.org.
For example, the “Equal Access Act” prevents
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however, such as Title VII’s prohibition on
discrimination by employers, have been less
successful. What factors explain the differ
ence? Since the primary interpreters of statutes
in the United States are the Justices of the
Supreme Court, clearly the inclinations of
those Justices might have something to do
with explaining the differences. But the spe
cific language and textual structure that the
legislature chooses to employ also turns out
to have very important implications for how
well the statutes promote religious liberty.
In this article I will briefly recount the
successes and failures of RFRA and Title VII
and then conclude with some thoughts about
what lessons the various legislatures of the
United States (federal, state, and otherwise)
and the legislatures of other countries might
take from the U.S. Congress’s mixed record of
protecting religious freedom through statute.

The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act
Prior to 1990, the Supreme Court had held
on numerous occasions that under the Free
Exercise Clause, the government (whether it
be federal, state, or local) could only burden
the religious practices of individuals through
general laws (such as generally applicable
criminal prohibitions) if it had a compelling
reason and used the narrowest means pos
sible. Although the Court had diluted this
so-called “strict scrutiny” to some degree by
creating a variety of exceptions to the general
rule,3 the Supreme Court’s approach in this
area provided a significant amount of protec
tion to religious believers. For example, in
a series of cases beginning with Sherbert v.
Vernerd the Court held that the government
could not deny unemployment compensation
to an employee fired for refusing to work on
a specific day for religious reasons. Likewise,
in the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder,5 the Court
found that the state of Wisconsin lacked any
compelling reason to require Amish teenag
ers to attend school in violation of their
religious beliefs or those of their parents.
In 1990, however, the Supreme Court
reversed course when it decided the case of
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Employment Division v. Smith,6 which held
that the government is free to impose burdens
on religious believers so long as it does so
through general laws that do not single out
religion or any particular religious practice for
discriminatory treatment. The case involved a
Native American who sought unemployment
compensation after being fired for using a
controlled substance known as peyote during
a religious ritual. When the state of Oregon
denied his claim, he sued the state for violating
his First Amendment rights, citing Sherbert
and Yoder. The Court, however, rejected his
claim and issued a new statement of the law:
“ [T] he right of free exercise does not relieve
an individual of the obligation to comply with
a valid and neutral law of general applicabil
ity on the ground that the law proscribes
... conduct that his religion prescribes.”7
The Court’s decision proved very
unpopular with both religious groups
and political leaders, and Congress acted
quickly to remedy the situation. It passed
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA) to re-establish the pre-Smith
rule. Specifically, the statute provides that:
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially
burden a person’s exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability, except as pro
vided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden
a person’s exercise of religion only
if it demonstrates that application
of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compel
ling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means
of furthering that compel
ling governmental interest.8
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Under U.S. law, Congress must act under a
power given to it by the Constitution in order
to enact a valid statute. The Constitution, for
example, gives Congress the power to pass
laws to protect interstate commerce, to imple
ment the nation’s treaty agreements, and to
enforce the due process and equal protection
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In passing RFRA, Congress justified the
statute as an exercise of its power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment. For reasons not
important here, the Supreme Court in 1995
held that this constitutional power did not
authorize Congress to apply RFRA to state
and local governments;9 as of this date, how
ever, there seems to be little doubt that RFRA
validly applies to the federal government.
Interestingly, Congress might have been
able to apply RFRA to the states and local
governments through its constitutional power
to implement the nation’s treaty obligations.
As Columbia Law School Professor Gerald
Neuman has argued, Congress might have
been able to justify RFRA as a vehicle for
implementing U.S. obligations under Article
18 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.10 That Article purports to give
every person the right “to manifest his religion
or belief in worship, observance, practice and
teaching,” and limits the government’s right
to infringe on that right only when “neces
sary to protect public safety, order, health, or
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms
of others.” Although Article 18 is in some
ways more protective of individual freedom
than RFRA (it protects nonreligious as well
as religious beliefs) and in some ways less so
(RFRA’s compelling interest standard is likely
more stringent than Article 18’s “necessary”
standard), Neuman argues that “Congress
could have justified RFRA itself as a means
of effectuating Article 18,” since it “could rea
sonably find that the traditional categories of
religious exercise and compelling interest pro
vided an appropriate mechanism for protecting
the manifestation of religious beliefs in practice
within the legal system of the United States.”11
Until last year, the Supreme Court had
not yet decided how much protection RFRA

provides to religious believers from the bur
dens imposed on them by federal law. In the
2006 case of Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal,12 however, the
Court held that the statute provides quite a
bit of protection. The case involved a small
American branch of a Brazilian Christian
Spiritist sect that uses a sacramental tea
called hoasca in one of its major ceremonies.
Because this tea contains a hallucinogenic
drug that is illegal under U.S. law, the
U.S. Customs Service intercepted a ship
ment of it and threatened the group with
prosecution. The sect sued the government,
arguing that seizing the tea and prosecut
ing the group for possession or use of the
tea would violate its rights under RFRA.
The Court, in a unanimous 8-0 opinion,13
agreed with the sect that the government had
violated its religious freedom rights under
the statute. The government conceded that
prohibiting the group from using the drug
would “substantially burden” the group’s
religious exercise, but it argued that this
burden was justified by a variety of compel
ling interests, most notably the government’s
interest in the uniform application of its laws
governing controlled substances. The Court
rejected this argument. Focusing on the
specific language of RFRA and looking back
to its earlier decisions in Sherbert and Yoder
for guidance, it concluded that the Court
should “loofk] beyond broadly formulated
interests justifying the general applicability
of government mandates and scrutinizfe] the
asserted harm of granting specific exemp
tions to particular religious claimants.”19
The Court then analyzed the likely effect of
granting an exception from the Controlled
Substances Act to the sect itself and found
that the government had not provided any
compelling interest to justify burdening the
sect’s religious practice by prohibiting its use
of the hoasca. Importantly, the Court looked
to the federal government’s long-standing
practice of exempting Native Americans’ use
of peyote from the same drug laws as evidence
that granting another small exemption would
not undermine any compelling state interest.
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Although the Gonzales case made clear that
NEPA, the Court pointed out that unlike the
the government must shoulder a significant
regulations enforcing NEPA, which make it
burden before directly regulating religious
clear that the statute applies to any “actions ...
activity under its criminal laws, a more recent
which are potentially subject to Federal control
and responsibility,”16 the language of RFRA
case from the courts of appeals demonstrates
failed
that RFRA’s protective scope outside this
to demonstrate that Congress intended
scenario remains uncertain. What if instead of
to reach into “the far reaches of government
directly regulating religious activity, the federal activities,” such as federal funding or approval
of state or local projects.17 The court looked
government merely approves of a state or local
activity that significantly
back to the pre-Smith
burdens someone’s reli
free exercise standard
THE STATUTE ON ITS FACE
gious practice? That was
that RFRA intended
COULD REQUIRE EMPLOYERS TO
the issue considered by
to resurrect and found
ACCOMMODATE RELIGION IN
the D.C. Circuit Court
no evidence in the
NEARLY ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, IN
of Appeals in Village of
relevant cases to show
Bensenville v. Federal
that such tangential
SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, OR IN
Aviation Administration
federal action had ever
NEARLY NO CIRCUMSTANCES AT ALL
last year.15 There,
triggered any special
the Federal Aviation
protection. The dis
Administration (FAA) agreed to fund (under
sent, on the other hand, believed that both
specific standards set out by federal law) a
the pre-Smith free exercise law and the
plan by the City of Chicago to expand O’Hare
plain language of RFRA clearly covered the
International Airport. Plaintiffs argued that
FAA’s funding decision, a decision that it
the FAA’s approval of the project violated
characterized as “a federal agency’s intense
their rights under RFRA because the expan
involvement in a plan that substantially
burdens religious exercise.”18 Because the
sion plan would require the relocation of a
church cemetery. The issue of whether RFRA
court that decided Village ofBensenville is
covers burdens imposed by state and local
a lower court with a limited (albeit impor
projects that require federal approval is a very
tant) jurisdiction, the question of whether
important question because under the U.S.
RFRA applies to funding and approval
system of federalism, a great many state and
decisions of the federal government outside
local projects must obtain federal approval or
of that jurisdiction remains an open one.
permitting or funding to proceed. Under an
important environmental statute called the
Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
for example, courts have held that such federal
1964 to combat certain types of discrimina
approvals can sometimes be considered “federal tion on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity,
actions,” thus requiring the federal agencies
and religion. Various Chapters (or “Titles”)
to consider the environmental impacts of the
of the Act focus on different forms of dis
state or local projects they plan to approve.
crimination. For example, Title II prohibits
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in a
places of public accommodation such as
2-1 decision, rejected the argument that RFRA hotels, restaurants, and theaters from engag
covered the FAA’s approval of Chicago’s proj
ing in discrimination; Title VI prohibits
ect. Although the court was willing to assume
federal agencies from discriminating. Most
that moving the church cemetery would
important for purposes of this essay, Title VII
significantly burden the plaintiffs’ religious
of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employers
exercise rights, the court was not convinced
with more than fifteen employees from dis
that the federal government was responsible
criminating against any employee with regard
for this burden. Rejecting the analogy to
to any employment-related decision (hiring,
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firing, demotion, etc.) on the basis of race,
gender, ethnicity, or religion. Specifically,
section 703 of Title VII provides that:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employ
ment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or oth
erwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because
of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
In a 1972 amendment, Congress attempted
to clear up some confusion about the stat
ute’s meaning by adding section 701 (j),
which purports to define “religion”:
The term “religion” includes all
aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an
employer demonstrates that he is
unable to reasonably accommodate to
an employee’s religious observances
without undue hardship on the
conduct of the employer’s business.
Because the statute does not further
define the critical phrases “reasonably accom
modate” and “undue hardship,” however, it
is ambiguous as to how much protection is
actually provided to religion in the workplace.
Depending on the meaning of these phrases,
the statute on its face could require employ
ers to accommodate religion in nearly all
circumstances, in some circumstances, or in
nearly no circumstances at all. Through its use
of vague and undefined terms, Congress left
to the courts, and especially to the Supreme
Court, the critical decision of how much
protection the statute would provide. As the
Court itself recognized when it addressed
the issue five years after the amendment was
added: “ [T] he statute provides no guidance
for determining the degree of accommoda
tion that is required of an employer.”19

The Court addressed the scope of Title
VII, as it relates to religious discrimina
tion, in two cases: Trans World Airlines v.
Hardison,20 decided in 1977, and Ansonia
Board ofEducation v. Philbrook21 in 1986.
In these two cases, the Court made it clear
that the statute provides very little protection
to religious employees who allege that their
employers have discriminated against them on
the basis of their religious beliefs or practices.
In Hardison, the plaintiff claimed that his
religious beliefs prohibited him from working
on Saturdays and asked his employer to excuse
him from working on that day. An agreement
between the employer and the labor union
representing the employees prohibited the
employer from forcing an employee with more
seniority than the plaintiff to switch work
ing days with the plaintiff, and the employer
refused to violate that agreement. The employer
also refused to allow the plaintiff to work a
four-day week. When the plaintiff refused to
come to work on Saturdays, the employer fired
him, and the plaintiff then sued the employer
for violating his rights under Title VII.
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court
rejected the plaintiff’s claim. The Court
thought that the only way to satisfy the
plaintiff’s demand to stay home on Saturdays
would be to force another employee to work on
that day, which would amount to discrimina
tion against the other employee. The Court
did not think that the statute required such
discrimination. Specifically, it wrote: “As we
have seen, the paramount concern of Congress
in enacting Title VII was the elimination of
discrimination in employment. In the absence
ofclear statutory language or legislative history
to the contrary, we will not readily construe the
statute to require an employer to discriminate
against some employees in order to enable
others to observe their Sabbath.”22 In reach
ing this decision, the Court announced a very
lenient standard for measuring whether an
employer has complied with the anti-discrimi
nation requirements of the statute: “To require
[an employer] to bear more than a de minimis
cost in order to give [a plaintiff] Saturdays
off is an undue hardship.”23 This standard
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renders the statute almost entirely useless in
reasonable accommodation. By its
protecting religious employees. If an accommo
very terms the statute directs that
dation would cost the employer any significant
any reasonable accommodation by
amount at all, the employer does not have
the employer is sufficient to meet its
to accommodate the employee. Only if the
accommodation obligation__Thus,
accommodation would be basically costless
where the employer has already rea
does the employer have an obligation under the
sonably accommodated the employee’s
statute to accommodate the religious believer.
religious needs, the statutory inquiry
In Philbrook, the Court further made it
is at an end. The employer need not
clear that if more than one
further show that
possible accommodation
each of the employee’s
ONLY IF THE ACCOMMODATION
exists, the employer can
alternative accommo
WOULD BE BASICALLY COSTLESS
choose which accommoda
dations would result
DOES THE EMPLOYER HAVE
in undue hardship.24
tion to offer rather than
AN OBLIGATION UNDER THE
giving the employee his pre
ferred accommodation. In
The combination
STATUTE TO ACCOMMODATE
that case, a teacher requested
of the Court’s opin
THE RELIGIOUS BELIEVER
six days off per year to
ions in Hardison and
celebrate his religion’s holy
Philbrook has resulted
days. Because the labor agreement between the
in Title VII providing very few safeguards
school board and the teachers’ union provided
for religion. As one commentator has put it,
for only three days of (paid) leave per year for
“With these two leading decisions, Title VII
religious purposes, the teacher asked if he could has been rendered largely meaningless as a
use his allotted “personal business” days (also
source of protection for the religiously obser
vant employee of the secular employer.”25
paid) for the other three days or if he could
pay himself for the cost of a substitute teacher
for those three days while receiving his full
Lessons and Comparisons
salary. The school board rejected both requests
Does an analysis of these two statutes pro
and instead allowed the teacher to take unpaid
vide any lessons as to how legislatures might
leave for the three days in question, a policy
best go about protecting religious freedom
that undoubtedly constituted a reasonable
through statute? Surely, caveats are in order.
accommodation under the statute. Claiming
These are only two statutes, and it may not be
that his proposed accommodations would
proper to generalize from such a small set of
also be reasonable (i.e., basically costless to
examples. Moreover, turnover at the Supreme
the school), the teacher sued, arguing that the
Court has meant that different judicial panels
board should have given him his preferred rea
have been involved in interpreting the two
sonable accommodation rather than the board’s statutes, so it might be the case that any dif
own preferred reasonable accommodation.
ferences in how the laws have been applied
Once again, the Court sided with the
can be traced merely to differences in Court
employer. As in the Hardison case, the Court
personnel. And finally, of course, it is by no
pointed to the lack of any direction in the stat
means clear that lessons learned in one legal
ute or its legislative history that would require
system are necessarily translatable to other
employers to offer the specific accommoda
legal systems, at least in any direct fashion.
tion sought by the employee rather than some
Nonetheless, I would like to cautiously suggest
other accommodation. The Court explained:
five possible lessons that interested actors could
choose to take from the U.S. Congress’s mixed
We find no basis in either the statute
success in protecting religion through statute.
or its legislative history for requiring
First, it would seem unwise for legislatures
an employer to choose any particular
to rely upon courts to interpret ambiguous or
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unclear statutes in a way that would provide
strong protection for religion. Too many
interests are involved in cases that touch on
religious freedom to assume that courts will
necessarily promote the interest in religious
freedom over other important interests. For
example, the Title VII cases indicate that the
U.S. Supreme Court was quite concerned
with the effects that protecting religious
workers would have not only on their employ
ers, but also on other employees. Promoting
the interests of the religious employees to
have an extra day off would require some
other employee—perhaps one with more
seniority—to work on that day against his or
her wishes. Without a statute that unambigu
ously directed the Court to favor the religious
interest over other comparable interests, the
Court was not willing to take that step itself.
The second lesson is closely related to the
first: If a legislature wants religious rights or
interests to trump other rights or interests, it
must draft the relevant statute to make this
unambiguously clear. The legislature’s failure
to do this is quite evident in the case of Title
VII. Instead of indicating that the courts
should always or nearly always find in favor of
religious freedom over the practical concerns of
employers and other employees, the Congress
provided that religious interests would prevail
unless the employer could not provide a “rea
sonable” accommodation without imposing an
“undue hardship” on its business. Ambiguous
and malleable terms such as “reasonable” and
“undue” are not the kinds of words that a
legislature should choose if it wants to ensure
a high level of protection for religion.
Third, to ensure that courts do apply a
high level of protection for religion, legislatures
can choose a standard that may on its face
be ambiguous, so long as it clear from past
practice, practices in other areas of law, or
some other source external to the statute itself,
that the standard is in fact a strict one. RFRA,
for example, uses the word “compelling” to
describe the high level of interest the govern
ment must have before substantially burdening
religion. On its face, without knowing how
this word has been used in other contexts by

the Supreme Court, one might read the word
as providing only an ambiguous amount of
protection, much like the words “reasonable”
or “undue” in Title VII. However, it is quite
clear to anyone with some knowledge of U.S.
constitutional law that this phrase (as well as
the “least restrictive means” requirement of
section (b)(2) of the statute) means that the
government must meet a very high burden
before regulating religion. The “compelling
interest” test is one that the Supreme Court
has used in a variety of contexts to signal the
most exacting scrutiny, and indeed it even used
it in Free Exercise Clause cases prior to 1990.
Fourth, legislatures ought to think seriously
about how broadly they wish their religionprotective statute to apply, and they should
explicitly address this issue in the legislation
itself. In other words, legislatures should think
about what questions might arise with regard
to the potential scope of the statute, and make
sure to answer those questions explicitly either
positively or negatively. Moreover, in doing
so, they should look to other statutes, includ
ing statutes in other areas of law, for possible
issues that could arise in the application of
the legislation. The example of RFRA in the
United States points out the importance of
this issue. Although the question of whether
federal approvals of state and local projects
should be considered action under the statute
is one that Congress could have anticipated
if it had looked to NEPA for guidance, the
legislature failed to address that important
question in RFRA itself. As a result, at least
one court has already had to grapple with
the issue, and others will probably do so in
the future. This imposes unnecessary costs
on courts and litigants, and creates unnec
essary uncertainty for all parties possibly
affected by the law. In addition, it may also
result in courts creating a rule of law that
the legislature would not have agreed with,
had it considered the issue explicitly itself.
Finally, comparing the text and structure
of RFRA and Title VII reveals some possible
lessons about how legislatures should draft and
structure statutes to protect religious freedom.
RFRA is drafted very clearly and in simple
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language. Its structure is also quite straight
forward. The statute has two parts: a blanket
prohibition, and a single exception to that
prohibition. The prohibition and the exception
are in separate sections, and the prohibition
makes it clear that it will apply unless and only
if the exception applies. Moreover, the statute
covers only one topic—burdening of religious
exercise—rather than addressing several topics.
The limited focus of the statute, along with
its clear text and structure, has certainly made
it easier for courts to interpret its meaning
and to apply it in a way that has provided
significant protection for religious freedom.
Title VII, by contrast, is neither clear
nor limited in focus. The original statute
applies a clear prohibition to various sorts of
discrimination, but because discrimination
on the basis of religion is different in some
respects from discrimination on the basis of
race, color, sex, and national origin, Congress
was forced to amend the statute later on to
clarify its meaning with regard to religion.
This illustrates that drafters might consider
the benefits of drafting statutes which isolate
religion and treat it specially, rather than
grouping it with other types of attributes.
Moreover, when Congress did amend the
statute by defining “religion,” it did so in a very
unclear fashion. Several problems exist with
the added language. For one thing, it includes
the substantive standard for accommodation
(reasonable, without undue hardship on the
employer) as part of its definition of “religion,”
which makes little sense and is simply confus
ing. Second, as noted above, the standard for
accommodation is stated in very vague and
ambiguous language. Finally, although the
statute is basically an anti-discrimination stat
ute, the exception added by the new language
(no discrimination unless not discriminating

would cause hardship on the employer) at
least arguably appears to completely undo the
anti-discrimination mandate of the original
statute. It is no surprise that courts have not
known what to do with the statute, since
it seems self-contradictory. Unlike RFRA,
which imposes a blanket prohibition subject
to a single limited exception, Title VII as it
applies to religion imposes a blanket prohibi
tion subject to a near complete exception.
This is a strange way to draft a statute to
protect religion, and legislatures seeking to
learn something from the U.S. experience
might be wise to avoid copying this example.

Conclusion
It is never easy to write a statute, and
when religion is involved, the task becomes
even harder. The decision to protect religion
inevitably raises a host of difficult ques
tions: How much protection to provide?
How should competing concerns be bal
anced? How does one even define religion?
Moreover, the enacting body is unlikely to
be able to predict all of the issues that could
possibly arise under the statute over time.
Nations that are choosing now to begin
struggling with these questions can ben
efit from looking to examples from other
countries. Of course, legal systems differ
tremendously, and every nation has its own
unique religious culture, but some general
lessons likely transcend these differences. As
illustrated above, the United States provides
a number of examples for other nations to
look to in this regard. The mixed case of
protecting religion through statute in the
United States suggests that transitional legal
systems can learn a lot from the U.S. about
what to do—and what not to do—to give
religion the protection it deserves. ♦♦♦
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